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Foreign capital has been of paramount importance in the creation of urban 
infrastructures because of the magnitude of the investments involved, their 
technological complexity, and the management difficulties associated with such 
undertakings. This was especially true in the emerging field of elec- tricity and other 
associated activities such as tramways. Investment was often motivated by a desire to 
open up new industrial markets, and certain coun- tries began to concentrate on 
specific sectors.1 German capital focused on electrical engineering, the French on 
urban gas lighting, and the Belgians on tram companies and light railways, in some 
cases acting as a bridgehead for German electrical groups.2 Meanwhile the British 
concentrated on telegraph, services, water supplies and tramways.3 
Hitherto, historical research has concentrated on individual borrower coun- tries or 
on the specifi fi of electricity.4 In this article the international invest- ments made by 
Belgium are analysed both geographically and quantitatively, within the urban 
transport sector, a sector which has been little researched and in which Belgium played a 
leading role in several countries.5 The article looks at the importance of foreign 
ownership in transport enterprises, a subject of on-going debate in transport 
historiography. The hypothesis that the article puts forward is that the promotion of 
tramway enterprises abroad, via Belgian capital, is linked with the search for new 
markets for the steel and engineering industries. To this end new evidence will be 
provided which sheds light on this relationship. This contribution will help us to 
better understand the role of Belgian capital in promoting tramway networks 
throughout the world, the motives behind such investment and the mechanisms and 
strategies used. 
There are two clearly discernible stages with respect to the periods in which tram 
enterprises were set up abroad by Belgian firms. In the first of these periods, up to 
the First World War, the importance of tramway companies increased steadily, 
while the second, the inter-war period, was one of decline. The expansion of tramway 
networks and their electrification took place largely in the first stage. Once the 
basic networks were in place, the economic and political convulsions of the 1920s and 
1930s led to the second stage. This article focuses on the first of these periods, which is 
more important from an historical perspective. The broader context of Belgian 
finance provides us with a backdrop against which we can better situate Belgian 
foreign investment in tramways. To this end I will first analyse the geographical 
distribution of tramway companies registered in Brussels for the years 1892, 1913 and 
 
  
1935.6 Second, I will study certain data pertinent to the main Belgian holding 
companies active in the tramway sector: the founding of the companies, their 
capital and share ownership. I also attempt to analyse the portfolios of these 
groups in order to carry out a geo-economic evaluation of their development. 
Finally, I shall illustrate the evolution of Belgian holding companies by 
analysing the progress of the Compagnie mutuelle de tramways, one of the most 
important holding companies. 
 
The growing importance of Belgian foreign investment in tramways up 
to 1914 
Belgium based its industrial development on several favourable factors of a 
geographical, historical and organisational nature.7 The surplus of the indus- trial 
revolution’s basic resources, coal and iron, was a great advantage and this 
determined the nature of Belgian industrialisation, which focused on the iron, 
steel and mining industries. Fundamental to the consolidation of this model 
were advances taking place in the banking system. 
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Belgian financial 
systems developed to such an extent that the financial sector was to become the 
most important in the economy, acting as a motor of industrialisation and giving 
rise to the mixed banks.8 The mixed banks, those that operated both as 
commercial and merchant banks, promoted industrial enterprises and pub- lic 
utilities through the provision of long-term loans and through their finan- cial 
participation in these companies. Mixed banking in Belgium began in the 1830s 
when the Société générale was forced to accept shares in industrial companies 
with financial problems in return for the cancellation of debts. From 1870 
onwards, and especially after 1895, the activities of the Belgian mixed banking 
system became increasingly international in outlook. This trend was led by the 
Société générale and subsequently imitated by others.9 Thus it was within this 
context that the model of the ‘holding company’ reached maturity.10 One of the 
main advantages of this model was that the banks no longer had to manage 
their own industrial portfolios. That side of their business was entrusted to 
specialist organisations, reducing the amount of capital they had tied up, and so 
indirectly extending banking control and the modernisation of the sectors 
involved. 
Belgian mixed banks and holding companies were neither hierarchical in 
structure nor centralised, as was the case in the United States or Germany. In fact 
it was not until after the Second World War that a new system of business 
organisation was imposed on Belgian companies by the Americans and Germans. 
A sectoral analysis of large Belgian businesses confirms the clear predominance of heavy 
industry throughout the whole of the period 1892–1938 
  
(Table 1) – a period in which, with the exception of 1938 itself, transport 
companies (railways and tramways) constituted the biggest companies in 
Belgium. The temporary drop in the number of businesses in the transport 
sector at the end of the nineteenth century was due largely to company 
mergers and the decline in the construction of the new railways. This trend 
was reversed by the impetus that came from the explosive growth in urban 
transport both in Belgium and elsewhere during the early twentieth century. 
 
Table 1   The fifty largest Belgian companies, 1892–1938a 
 
Sector 1892 1900 1910 1920 1930 1938 
Transport 27 (64) 19 (54) 26 (65) 17 (46) 7 (20) 3 (6) 
Metals and metal processing 7 (13) 12 (18) 7 (11) 14 (27) 11 (27) 10 (22) 
Non-ferrous metals 2 (4) 2 (3) 2 (2) 4 (8) 4 (8) 3 (7) 
Electricity and gas 5 (9) 6 (9) 8 (9) 5 (5) 11 (6) 12 (21) 
Coal 3 (3) 5 (6) 3 (4) 1 (1) 2 (2) 4 (5) 
Variousb 6 (7) 6 (10) 4 (9) 9 (13) 15 (27) 18 (39) 
Total 50 (100) 50 (100) 50 (100) 50 (100) 50 (100) 50 (100) 
Notes a By assets, including only industrial limited liability companies quoted on the Brussels stock 
exchange. The percentages, in brackets to the right of these figures, represent the sum of the fifty biggest 
Belgian companies’ assets. b In 1938 half these companies were colonial companies. 
Source H. Wee, ‘Large firms in Belgium, 1892–1974: an analysis of their structure and growth’, in 
D. C. Coleman and P. Mathias, Enterprise and History (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 202–3. 
 
The period 1870–1914 was the Golden Age of foreign investment, and this 
was to be especially intense during the decade prior to the First World War.11 
Belgium, despite its small size, was to exercise appreciable weight in terms 
of investment.12 
From 1870 onwards mixed banking and especially the Société générale 
played a major role, both directly and indirectly via its holding companies, 
in the setting up of Belgian firms abroad, especially in the transport sector.13 
This occurred largely as a response to the relative saturation of the Belgian 
railway market, which meant that there were few further opportunities for 
internal investment. The banks responded by channelling their resources into 
tramway projects abroad in order to stimulate demand for their coal and 
metal subsidiaries. This market saturation was a general feature in Western 
Europe: the share of railways and tramways as a proportion of fixed capital 
investment decreased sharply after 1860 in most countries.14 
It should also be emphasised that, whilst Belgian capital began to find its 
way into foreign markets, foreign investment was also on the increase in 
Belgium, owing to fiscal and institutional factors.15 These flows of capital 
reflected the growing internationalisation of capital, acting in different sec- 
tors; in the case of Belgium this involved investment in tramways abroad and 
foreign investment coming into Belgium, aimed mainly at the electrical 
and financial sectors. Much of this foreign investment in Belgium was French, 
and French capital became the strongest investment force in Belgium after the 
unification of the French and Belgian monetary systems within the framework 
of the Latin Monetary Union of 1865. The Franco-Prussian War accelerated    
  
the flow of French capital into Belgium. German investment in Belgium, 
which had been non-existent prior to 1880, also grew spectacularly up to the 
First World War, especially in the chemical, electrical and metallurgical sec- 
tors, and in the Belgian colonies. This investment was viewed in a somewhat 
negative light because of its supposed ‘imperialistic’ nature.16 From 1895 
German capital, in particular the electrical giant AEG, created holding com- 
panies in order to manage their foreign investments. German investment took 
place in politically sensitive regions such as France or Latin America either 
directly or via the bridgeheads of Brussels and Zurich.17 German participation 
in Belgian holding companies was usually carried out indirectly, through 
Belgian banks in which German participation was predominant.18 
The creation of tramways and light railway companies, both in Belgium 
and abroad, underwent a series of fluctuations, which are shown in Table 2.19 
These fluctuations reflect the different stages of Belgian investment up to 
1913 and, in turn, the general business cycles of the Belgian economy.20 They 
suggest that the main variable in the choice of investment is the state of the 
Belgian financial market up to 1913 rather than the investment options of the 
borrowing countries. The first tramway companies, of which the light rail- 
way companies constituted a small minority, were to appear in the 1870s. 
These companies came about largely as a result of the stock market boom 
which accompanied the institutional liberalisation of 1873 and the arrival of 
French capital after the Franco-Prussian War, which increased throughout 
the early 1880s.21 Later in the 1880s and in the early 1890s there was stag- 
nation with regard to investment, coinciding with the agrarian depression 
and stock market crisis. During this period almost all Belgian investment in 
tramways took place either in Belgium itself, where the holding companies 
were set up, or in France, Italy and Germany. 
The period 1894–1913 witnessed intense growth in investment in 
tramways. This was a consequence of the expansion of the economy as a 
Table 2   Tramways and light railways set up by Belgian companies, 1874–1933 
 
 
  
Average No. 
 
company capital Average company 
 Period Of companies (BFr million) Capital (BFr million) 
1874–1878 8 82.3 10.3 
1879–1883 30 300.2 10.0 
1884–1888 3 14.0 4.7 
1889–1893 3 52.0 17.3 
1894–1898 28 223.6 8.0 
1899–1903 11 305.8 27.8 
1904–1908 24 237.8 9.9 
1909–1913 19 225.4 11.9 
1914–1918 1 18.0 18.0 
1919–1923 0 – – 
1924–1928 3 172.5 57.5 
1929–1933 1 30.0 30.0 
Source Recueil Financier, 1893, 1915 and 1936. 
  
  
whole, an expansion which helped to nullify the effects of the earlier stock 
market crises.22 In the case of the tramways, the saturation of the railway mar- 
kets stimulated the need to look for new markets for the coal and metal 
industries.23 Growth in this period was also undoubtedly linked with the 
process of electrification. The technological advances that were taking place 
generated a plethora of opportunities for investment which had a ‘knock-on’ 
effect upon other industries. In Madrid, for instance, the Société générale de 
tramways électriques d’Espagne, a Belgian company that controlled the 
Madrid network, bought 105 Belgian electric motors for trams between 1900 
and 1908 in addition to 100 from Westinghouse and fifty-seven from the 
American-French Thomson Houston.24 The electrification of trams implied 
not only a strong increase in investment but also a change in the composition 
of the assets. As assets the tramways themselves were now more valuable 
in that they represented an increasing proportion of overall investment. 
Electric traction gave rise to increases in flexibility, speed and capacity, 
and resulted in cheaper fares. The electrification of tramways also signalled 
the change from a middle-class to a truly ‘popular’ form of transport in the 
broadest sense.25 
The electrification of tramway networks was the main goal of Belgian hold- 
ing companies. They were especially interested in the big cities because of the 
size of these markets and the economies of scale they offered. The compa- 
nies’ modus operandi was: first acquire the operating companies which were 
too small to carry out electrification unaided, then proceed to unify the whole 
network and finally carry out the electrification work itself. Financial 
resources for tramway operators usually came from their holding companies, 
which issued shares or, more commonly, debentures. In the small cities the 
tram operating companies were often owned by local businesses, which 
obtained their finance from local banks, which themselves were often linked 
with the tram network enterprise. The electrification and expansion of the 
tramway networks implied a considerable increase in demand for vehicles 
and the materials needed for electrification. Tramcar bodies usually came 
from Belgian manufacturers while the United States and Germany supplied 
the electrical equipment, with German electromechanical concerns often act- 
ing through Belgian firms. 
The years between 1894 and 1913 constitute a stage in which Belgian 
tramway investment became more international in character, the majority 
of the new investment being channelled into Russia, the Middle East, Spain 
and Italy.26 
The opportunities for internal investment in Belgium became scarcer as 
the urbanisation process continued and railway and tramway networks were 
completed. These circumstances served as an incentive for Belgian banks to 
channel savings into foreign investment, mainly towards the construction of 
tramway networks. These in turn created an important source of demand for 
the products of Belgian manufacturing industry, which often belonged to 
the banks. The process was to reach its zenith during the period 1895–1913. 
Belgian industries (Franc-Belge de la Croyère, etc.) usually provided    
  
basic products such as rails and tramcar sub-frames, while Brill, either in 
Philadelphia or at its Paris branch, made the underframe and running gear. 
Electrical equipment such as motors, dynamos and cable mechanisms usually 
came from Germany (AEG, Siemens) or the United States (General Electric, 
Westinghouse) and occasionally from Belgium itself (Constructions élec- 
triques de Charleroi). These parts were subsequently assembled by specialist 
companies in the country that had ordered them.27 One of the main reasons 
why German electromechanical products were so competitive was the excel- 
lent terms of payment extended to foreign customers. This was possible 
because of the industry’s links with mixed banks. A further aspect of this 
process was the international flow of technological expertise in tramways, 
principally between the United States and Germany, and to a lesser extent 
among other countries, whereby the patent-holding company licensed the 
use of certain kinds of technology to other companies.28 
Analysis of the geographical distribution of Belgian investment reveals 
that in 1892 the number of Belgian tramway companies was already high 
(Table 3). A significant number of them, especially in terms of their capital, 
were owned by companies based solely in Belgium. At that time, however, 
the main thrust of Belgian capital investment was focused abroad; foreign 
investment accounted for about 67 per cent of total investment. Investors’ 
preferences during the initial phase of international growth were for Euro- 
pean countries, especially France, Italy, Germany, Spain and also Russia, 
which was becoming an increasingly desirable target for foreign investment. 
 
Table 3   The geographical distribution of Belgian investment in tramway and light 
railway companies in 1892, 1913 and 1935 
 
  
1892 
   
1913 
   
1935 
 
 
No. of 
Capital 
(BF 
 
% of 
 
 
No. of 
Capital 
(BF 
 
% of 
 
 
No. of 
Capital 
(BF 
 
% of 
Region firms million) total 
 
firms million) total 
 
firms million) total 
Belgium 6 44.9 28.4  20 131.7 11.5  9 435.5 49.3 
Western Europe 
Mediterranean 
Europe 
6 
 
10 
18.8 
 
45.4 
11.9 
 
28.7 
 
5 
 
37 
52.3 
 
292.1 
4.6 
 
25.5 
 
5 
 
7 
41.5 
 
48.8 
4.7 
 
5.5 
Eastern Europe 7 38.0 24.0 
 
29 254.7 22.2 
 
9 66.2 7.5 
Latin America 0 0.0 0.0 
 
1 126.0 11.0 
 
2 125.0 14.1 
Middle East 1 3.6 2.3 
 
6 78.1 6.8 
 
4 167.0 18.9 
Far East 0 0.0 0.0 
 
3 19.8 1.7 
 
0 0.0 0.0 
Variousa 1 7.5 4.7 
 
9 192.7 16.8 
 
0 0.0 0.0 
Total 31 159.2 100.0 
 
110 1.147.4 100.0 
 
36 884.0 100.0 
Note a Principally made up of holding companies with interests in several countries. 
Source Recueil Financier, 1893, 1915 and 1936. 
 
The year 1913 saw the heaviest Belgian investment in tramways and light 
railways, and in the main this investment took place abroad. It was not sim- 
ply that investment levels in the tramway sector had substantially increased, 
 but that such investment was being channelled abroad and now constituted 
  
78 per cent of total investment. The number of companies and the capital 
they controlled grew spectacularly almost everywhere except in Western 
Europe. Relatively speaking, the expansion taking place outside Europe, and 
especially in the Middle East, which was an area of increasing strategic 
interest, was much greater. Spain, Italy and Russia were now being displaced 
by other countries such as Argentina and Egypt in terms of their importance. 
At the same time, other industrialised countries were completing and elec- 
trifying their national tramway networks but had little direct investment in 
this sector beyond their own borders.29 The United States and Germany 
exceeded other countries in terms of the number of networks electrified 
thanks to the pre-eminence of their position in the electrical industry.30 Over- 
head electric traction, which was developed in the United States, swept 
across North America. With the exception of Germany, Europe was initially 
reluctant to adopt the new system, on aesthetic grounds and because safety 
regulations were usually stricter than in the United States.31 The international 
expansion of the American electrical industry in Europe was, in the main, 
based on joint undertakings in which American technological superiority was 
married to local management and capital.32 In Germany the three leading 
firms (AEG, Siemens and Schuckert) were responsible for roughly 90 per 
cent of all electric tramway installations, and it was these companies in par- 
ticular which set up holding companies for tramway networks throughout 
Europe. The general pattern in Europe was for private enterprise, particu- 
larly in the form of the leading electromechanical firms, to diffuse innova- 
tions in transport technology throughout each individual country. This 
tendency was particularly marked in France, although Britain proved an 
exception. France possessed the least dense tramway network but the dens- 
est system of light railways, very few of which were electrified. French 
tramways were heavily dependent on American technology.33  In France a 
large proportion of the electromechanical industry’s surplus capital was set 
aside for the electrification of its tramway subsidiaries and in large measure 
the electrical firms’ profits came from the manufacture of tram-related prod- 
ucts. Profits derived from selling their technological services to the tramway 
companies, although dividends from the tram subsidiaries themselves con- 
stituted a small proportion of the whole. From 1902 the French electrical 
engineering groups, which until then had specialised in traction, became 
active promoters of power stations, motivated by the saturation of the 
tramway market. Most of the medium-scale French foreign investment in 
trams was undertaken by Thomson-Houston de la Méditerranée, and took 
place primarily, as the name suggests, in the Mediterranean region.34 
In Britain many tram companies were owned by the county councils, and 
were set up with the example of the city of Glasgow in mind, which was 
to act as a model for subsequent tramway companies in Great Britain. The 
fact that the county councils managed the tram networks meant that the 
electrical companies were unable to exploit them, since they were not for- 
mally linked, in other words there was no ‘captive market’. British electrical 
producers remained relatively fragmented and acted in a highly competitive  
  
market.35 From 1900 onward this model became more popular throughout 
the whole of Europe, where at least some of the tramways in each leading 
country, except France, fell into municipal hands. In 1930, out of a total of 
fifty-seven European tram enterprises, thirty-three belonged to local coun- 
cils, twelve were private and twelve mixed.36 
The international entrepreneurial spirit had the effect of removing many 
of the differences between countries and regions with respect to the spread 
of electric tramways. Thus, in the same way that American enterprise was to 
be crucial in the spread of tramways throughout France and Great Britain, so 
German and French enterprise was to play a key role in the development of 
the Mediterranean countries. The influence of Belgian entrepreneurs in East- 
ern Europe and the Middle East may be seen as analogous to the role of their 
British counterparts in their colonies and in Latin America. 
Table 4 compares the levels of Belgian and British foreign investment mea- 
sured in tramway company shares.37 Belgium would seem to be the heavier 
foreign investor in tramways, at least as far as direct investment is concerned. 
There is a clear difference in the main recipients of these investments. Belgium 
channelled most of its investment towards Europe, especially Russia, Italy and 
Spain, whereas Britain’s investments were principally directed towards the 
United States, Argentina, Canada, Brazil and Mexico. As far as the other con- 
tinents were concerned British capital was centred on the Empire. It is note- 
worthy that only Argentina received important sums of capital from both 
Belgium and Britain and was therefore an exception to the rule that, gener- 
ally speaking, Belgian and British investment in tramways did not occur in the 
same countries. The investment strategy of both Belgium and Britain focused 
on a limited number of recipient countries. 80.2 per cent of Belgian, and 80.3 
per cent of British, foreign tramway investment went to five countries. A fur- 
ther difference is evident in the pattern of distribution for foreign tramway 
investment over time. In both countries foreign investment in tramways was 
most intense during the post-1893 period. Over the entire period analysed, 
87 per cent of British and 91.6 per cent of Belgian total investment in 
tramways was carried out abroad during this second period. Moreover, to an 
overwhelming extent, the investment taking place in this latter period 
involved the electrification of tramways, which obviously required large 
amounts of capital, while the investment taking place prior to 1893 was con- 
cerned with horse-drawn trams. During the pre-1893 period Britain’s invest- 
ment in tramways represented only 13.0 per cent of its total investment (in 
tramways) for the entire period, while the figure for Belgian investment was 
a mere 9.4 per cent. These figures show that British foreign investment in 
horse-drawn trams was greater than that of Belgium. This may be explained 
by the fact that the British began investing sooner than the Belgians and by the 
fact that the Belgians, who had the support of the German electromechanical 
groups, had the edge on the British in terms of technological innovation. In 
some cases, and in certain countries such as Spain, Belgian firms even went so 
far as to buy up British-owned horse-drawn tramways in order to electrify 
 their networks. 
  
Table 4   Belgian and British foreign shareholdings in tramway companies, 1865–1914, by 
recipient continent, expressed as a percentage of the total, and overall total (£ sterling) 
 
Continent Belgium Great Britain 
Europe 78.47 8.78 
North America – 47.39 
South America 7.46 34.06 
Africa 8.96 1.08 
Asia 5.11 5.64 
Australia – 3.06 
Total £33,984,000 £19,011,000 
Note The British figures include investment in buses. 
Sources Belgium: Recueil Financier; Great Britain: Stone, Global Export of Capital from Britain. 
 
Companies competing for a particular country’s public service contract 
were apt to make use of the specialist knowledge they had in respect of urban 
transport and their contacts within the power structures of the country in 
question, including any privileged information they might be able to obtain. 
In this sense, the role of the consul was crucial, with regard both to the pass- 
ing on of information connected with the nursing of government contacts 
and to guidance on the choice of supplier. The local consul played a key role 
in defending the interests of Belgian companies abroad, dealing with local 
politicians, competitors and trade unions. Belgium’s diplomats were active 
and efficient in this role.38 And in this sense the 128 reports on tramways sent 
in by Belgian consuls between 1894 and 1913 show clearly in which coun- 
tries Belgium had important investments in tramways.39 
The next stage in our analysis covers the holding companies. Twelve com- 
panies are selected, whose main activity focused on trams and light railways.40 
Unfortunately information on the majority of these twelve companies was 
available only up to 1913. The basic characteristics of each company are 
looked at: the year in which it was founded, its capital, the main share- 
holders, and the company’s investment portfolio. It was not possible to 
obtain all the information on each organisation, and this was especially true 
in the case of the company portfolios. Another limitation was that, in most 
of the holding companies, there was no asset valuation of the companies in 
each portfolio, so the relative weight of each company in the portfolio 
remains a mystery. Table 5 sets out the basic data. 
Most of the holding companies were set up in the years 1880–81 and more 
especially between the years 1895 and 1900, the two main periods of growth 
in the Belgian tramway sector. The capital entering the sector increased dur- 
ing the period studied, and this is reflected in the growth of these groups. The 
shareholders in the most powerful holding companies were the big banks 
(Banque de Bruxelles and Société générale41), and in the case of Sofina the 
German shareholders were particularly prominent.42 In the case of the 
smaller holding companies the shareholders were usually individuals. As time 
went on, and especially towards the end of the 1920s, mergers took place.43 
The various holding companies sometimes maintained close links with one 
  
Table 5   Basic data on Belgian tramway holding companies (BF million) 
 
Hold- 
ing co. 
Founding 
year 
Capital 
outlay 
Capital in 
1913 
 
Main shareholders involved in the founding year 
1 1880 7.5 15.0 Banque Philippson & Horwitz, Banque central 
    
anversoise 
2 1889 8.0 24.0 Banque de Bruxelles, Banque Paribas, 
    
Brugmann, Cassel 
3 1881 
 
1.5 Texier de la Pommeraye, Désiré Gilles 
4 1895 1.0 15.5 Banque auxiliaire de la Bourse 
5 1895 6.0 2.0 Edouard Otlet 
6 1896 1.0 3.5 Compagnie mutuelle de tramways 
7 1897 1.5 10.0 Cie générale de traction, Georges Chaudoir, 
    
Jules Nagelmackers 
8 1898 10.0 25.0 GEU, Disconto Gesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, 
    
Cassel, Josse Allard, Banque Liégeoise 
9 1900 5.0 1.3 Hutt 
10 1904 1.0 35.0 Edouard and François Empain 
11 1906 1.0 2.5 Edouard and Henri Thys, Firmin Lambeau, 
    
Désiré Maas, Ch. Dietrich 
12 1910 1.5 3.2 W. B. Hopkins, Gaston Philips 
Notes 1 Compagnie générale de chemins de fer secondaires, 2 Société générale de chemins de fer 
économiques, 3 Chemins de fer vicinaux belges,a 4 Compagnie mutuelle de tramways, 5 Union des 
tramways, 6 Société belge de tramways, 7 Société générale de tramways et d’applications d’électricité, 8 
Société financière de transports et d’entreprises industrielles (Sofina), 9 Compagnie internationale de 
tramways, 10 Compagnie générale de railways et d’électricité, 11 Société générale de tramways,b 12 
Tramways et electricite. 
a Not to be confused with the Société nationale des chemins de fer vicinaux, founded in 1884, which was 
State-owned but independently run from its inception and remained thus until it was split up in 1992. 
b Not to be confused with its homonym, set up by the Banque de Bruxelles in 1874 and taken over by the 
Société générale de chemins de fer économiques in 1882. It was the first tramway holding company. (R.  
Brion and J. L. Moreau, Tractebel 1895–1995 : les metamorphoses d’un groupe industriel, Brussels, 1995, 
pp. 22, 24). 
Source Recueil Financier, 1915, 1936. 
 
another, working together in the management of some companies, and it was 
not uncommon for a director to sit on the boards of various companies.44 
What the data reveal is that the holding companies at that time were invest- 
ing heavily in international markets. If we look at the holding companies’ 
shares in companies operating in Belgium, we find that they constitute barely 
12 per cent of the investment portfolios as a whole. Most foreign investment 
(about 60 per cent) took place in Europe, principally in Western and 
Mediterranean Europe, while the extra-European investment (20 per cent) is 
concentrated in America, especially in Latin America. The relatively low pres- 
ence in North America (only one holding company) reflects the fact that the 
area was more highly advanced in terms of technology and development, and 
that competition was stiffer – although in both Africa and Asia, where such 
was not the case, the relative presence was also low.45 It would seem to fol- 
low, therefore, that Belgian capital was being channelled towards markets 
where potential growth was high and which were at the same time accessi- 
ble. The results do not differ substantially from those in Table 3, except in 
the case of Western Europe. A distinction should also be drawn between the 
 holding companies with smaller portfolios, whose interests tended to be 
  
Table 6   Investment portfolios of Belgian tramway holding companies: geographical 
distribution in 1913 
 
1a 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Value of the portfoliob 33.7 31.8 1.3 38.2 17.5 2.4 72.0 195.6 
No. of countries 10 10 5 17 13 2 8 26 
No. of companies 31 40 7 49 44 12 42 180 
No. of securities 231,222 218,544 7,938 445,306 225,976 26,546 418,977 1,574,509 
Regions as a % of securities 
        
Belgium 5.1 3.1 58.5 16.9 1.5 0.0 19.6 11.7 
Western Europe 0.4 2.6 0.0 25.2 3.5 0.0 56.7 23.1 
Mediterranean Europe 32.9 64.3 0.6 8.4 16.1 99.0 0.0 20.1 
Eastern Europe 0.6 6.1 35.2 32.0 12.4 0.0 14.9 15.9 
Latin America 10.9 10.0 0.0 5.1 56.7 0.0 1.4 12.9 
North America 44.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 
Middle East 0.0 11.8 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 7.0 3.9 
Far East 4.7 0.3 0.0 9.8 1.4 0.0 0.1 3.7 
Unknownc 1.3 1.9 5.7 1.1 8.3 1.0 0.3 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes a Data from 1910. b BFr million. c Companies in which the absence of geographical data does not allow 
us to be more specifi  Generally these companies are probably companies operating in Belgium and in certain 
cases, multinational holding companies. 1 Compagnie général de chemins de fer secondaires, 2 Société   
générale de chemins de fer économiques, 3 Chemins de fer vicinaux belges, 4 Compagnie mutuelle de 
tramways, 5 Société fi de transports et d’entreprises industrielles (Sofi 6 Compagnie internationale 
de tramways, 7 Compagnie générale de railways et d’électricité. For the sake of obtaining a homogeneity that 
permits a better comparison I have handled the data related only to those holding companies whose   
investment portfolio was published for that year. Thus the twelve holding companies in Table 4 were reduced 
to seven, the most important companies in terms of capital in 1913. In some holding companies, only the  
names of their portfolio companies were mentioned; in others the kinds of stocks (basically shares and 
debentures of different types) and the quantity of stocks are also mentioned; in some companies the  
information was more complete, since it included the nominal value of most of the stocks as well. Because of 
this inconsistency I have decided to take as reference the number of stocks owned by each company. 
Source Recueil Financier, 1915. 
 
more polarised and centred in Mediterranean Europe and Belgium, and those 
with larger, more diversified portfolios, although they too concentrated most 
of their investment on a single region, normally Europe. The composition of 
these portfolios, in terms of sectors, is shown in Table 7. 
Table 6 provides an analysis of a number of financial groups, all dealing 
with urban public services, principally railway transport and electricity.46 
These are, in the main, holding companies, which have been either set up or 
absorbed by the large banks in order to better manage their industrial port- 
folios specialising in the transport sector. These companies constitute a clear 
example of horizontal merger, although there was also a certain tendency 
towards the integration of additional activities, such as networks of public 
utilities, particularly tramways, and electricity companies, and the inclusion 
of some companies from the iron and steel industry, although this was rather 
more unusual. In general the holding companies differed very little in the dis- 
tribution of their portfolios, except that the smaller holding companies 
tended to have a larger proportion of their investments focused on railway 
transport, while the larger groups maintained important levels of investment 
in the electrical sector.  
  
Table 7   Belgian tramway holding company portfilios in 1913 as a percentage of 
distribution according to sector 
 
Sector in % of securities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Tramways 24.9 70.8 100.0 46.4 36.6 15.6 41.9 42.1 
Tramways and electricity 1.1 9.3 0.0 18.6 9.5 0.6 1.3 8.1 
Tramways and railways 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Railways 68.7 10.6 0.0 0.5 3.2 70.7 15.8 16.9 
Water/gas/electricity 3.5 8.5 0.0 33.4 50.6 13.1 39.3 31.9 
Others 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes See Table 5. 
        
Source See Table 5. 
        
 
The better to illustrate the evolution of the tramway holding companies 
this study focuses on one of the most important companies, the Compagnie 
mutuelle des tramways. This holding company was set up by the Banque 
auxiliaire de la Bourse in 1895, during the second wave of the expansion of 
Belgian tramway companies, as a means by which the bank could manage its 
urban transport portfolio. From its inception the Mutuelle carried out most 
of its investments abroad, concentrating its activities in Eastern Europe and, 
in particular, the promising Russian market. On the eve of the First World 
War its investments outside Europe, especially in Argentina and Thailand, 
began to increase considerably. The company’s portfolio was heavily biased 
towards tramways but its assets also included light railways. The weight of 
investment in electrical companies was also to increase; although the elec- 
tricity sector is often linked with urban transport, it was initially regarded as 
complementary to the tramways. The Mutuelle’s strategy consisted of the 
unification, rationalisation and electrification of the tramway networks. Its 
policy was normally to try and obtain the electric lighting concession in order 
to guarantee a reliable demand for electricity and then to take advantage of 
the ‘synergy’ of controlling the two parallel industries. The acquisition of the 
tramway networks and their electrification required a great deal of capital, 
so it became necessary for the company to increase its resources by issuing 
shares or debentures. 
During the years 1900–02 there was a brief crisis which accelerated the 
process of merger which was already under way.47 Since the crisis was parti- 
cularly acute in Russia, there were repercussions on the Mutuelle, and it was 
eventually taken over by the Société générale. The decade prior the First 
World War constituted a new stage in the growth of Belgian tramway hold- 
ing companies, and collaboration among them in setting up or reorganising 
the predominant tram and electricity companies was widespread.48 
 
The slump in Belgian investment in tramways, 1914–38 
The First World War and the immediate post-war period were a turning 
 point for the Belgian economy. During the inter-war period Belgian foreign 
  
investment declined in favour of domestic and colonial markets. The reasons 
for this decline include losses in the First World War and the Bolshevik 
revolution, the rise of nationalist and municipal movements, the instability 
of exchange rates and the decrease in commercial contacts abroad.49 Yet after 
the First World War, and especially between 1925 and 1930, the rate of 
holding company creation intensified, first in the transport sector and later 
in the electrical sector.50 The banking system was also hit by the Depression 
in the 1930s and this led to the disappearance of the most recently created 
companies, which did not possess the reserves necessary to survive the crisis. 
One result was the enactment of banking Acts in 1934–35, which forced the 
banks to formally separate their deposit and investment activities, preference 
being given to short-term transactions and State loans. 
From 1914 onwards the Belgian transport sector was to encounter diffi- 
culties which were to cause a sharp fall in both the number of companies and 
the percentage of total capital (Table 1). The main reasons for this decline 
were the financial and organisational problems caused by the First World 
War, the seizure of companies in Russia during the Bolshevik revolution, and 
the Depression.51 The growth of the gas and electricity companies between 
1920 and 1938 reflects the increased consumption of gas and electricity, not 
solely by Belgian industry, but also by its tramway concerns. In fact, during 
this period, the tramway holding companies became dominated by electrical 
companies. If the years 1892–1920 constituted a phase in which there was 
little change with regard to Belgian corporate leadership, the years between 
the wars were much more dynamic in the sense that the leading companies in 
each sector, and the sectors themselves, were volatile because of the inherent 
instability of the era. 
During the inter-war period many Belgian-owned tramway companies 
abroad became nationally owned, that is, private local investors began to 
invest in these companies to the extent that the companies came under local 
control. It should be underlined, however, that, although a lot of companies 
were now in the hands of locally owned businesses, the electrical equipment 
for the trams continued to be bought abroad, although less technologically 
complex components, such as the underframe, began to be made locally. 
When there were difficulties importing vital parts the parts were increasingly 
obtained by ‘cannibalising’ old vehicles to produce new trams – a practice 
which was also common in Spain in the 1940s. One of the consequences of 
this method of modernisation was that the new trams usually displaced old 
ones on routes bordering the outskirts of cities. 
The state of the economy cannot in itself explain the disappearance of the 
most recently formed tramway companies. The home market had reached sat- 
uration point in terms of tramways, and this, combined with the fact that the 
omnibus was beginning to represent serious competition for the tram, goes 
some way towards explaining the decline.52 Faced with increasing economic 
difficulties, the end of the concession system, and the prospect of replacement 
with bus routes, the tramway companies themselves were disinclined to 
undertake the heavy investment needed to modernise their networks. The    
  
nationalist political climate in Europe encouraged companies to get rid of 
their assets abroad and made them reluctant to undertake new business 
ventures. The tramway companies were now heavily involved with the emerg- 
ing electrical industry and novel investment procedures were to reflect this 
close relationship. It is significant that the growth in the number of tramway 
companies set up after the First World War reached a peak during the years 
1928–30, a period which was to prove crucial for the process of business 
and financial amalgamation taking place in Belgium and especially in the 
electrical sector.53 During the period 1914–33 few new tramway companies 
were established in Belgium, and those that were resulted from mergers or 
non-profit-making  initiatives.54 
Average company capital investment was fairly high compared with other 
sectors, since the tramway sector was capital-intensive.55 The figures vary 
between BFr 8 million and BFr 12 million, and this figure rises steeply for the 
companies which were set up at the end of the 1920s, partly owing to the 
effects of high inflation and partly to the fact that firms in general were 
becoming larger. 
In the mid-1930s the outlook changed radically (Table 3). The effects of 
the inter-war period were much in evidence; during the 1930s even nominal 
investment decreased. Belgian capital during this period focused mainly on 
domestic tramway markets. European tramway profits decreased, to a large 
extent because of competition from other means of transport and a process 
of network expansion in which marginal costs outweighed marginal income. 
Rising levels of inflation also meant that operating costs were outstripping 
the income derived from passenger fares. In 1912, out of fifty-three Euro- 
pean tramway enterprises, only 10 per cent produced losses. In 1935 the fig- 
ure had risen to 51 per cent.56 Throughout the inter-war period the operating 
results of European tramway companies were in decline. In the years between 
1913 and 1921, out of a total of forty-five European tramway companies, 
only two reduced the length of their networks. Between 1921 and 1930 the 
figure rose to four and finally eighteen in the period from 1930 to 1935. 
Meanwhile between 1913 and 1921 eight companies reduced the number of 
trams in their fleets, a figure which increased to twelve in the period between 
1921 and 1930. Finally, while only two companies reported a decline in the 
number of passengers between 1913 and 1921, the figure rose to ten between 
1921 and 1930, and to forty-three in the period from 1930 to 1935. 
It should be underlined that the deterioration was progressive and more 
intense during the crisis of the 1930s. Moreover the crisis also affected 
bus companies, if to a lesser extent. In fact during the 1930s only nine bus 
companies had to reduce the length of their networks, while a further twenty- 
seven actually extended their route length. Similarly twelve bus companies 
reported a decline in the number of passengers while twenty-five reported 
increases.57 The displacement of the tramways by buses was especially intense 
on suburban lines, because the buses enjoyed the lower operating costs 
derived from road transport. Most of the early urban bus services in 
 Western and Central Europe began in the mid-1920s. The countries with the 
  
greatest number of buses used for urban transport were France and 
England.58 Just as the expansion of tramway networks took place much faster 
in the United States than in Europe, so decline proved faster there as well. In 
1920, of 376 US cities, there was not a single city without streetcars. In 1930, 
however, there were twenty-nine and by 1936 there were 125. 
By contrast, in Belgium the process had come full circle: at the end of the 
nineteenth century Belgium itself had been the focus of Belgian investment 
in trams. On the eve of the First World war the trend had been reversed and 
Belgian investment was targeted abroad. Finally, in the 1930s, Belgium itself 
was again the main focus of Belgian investment in tramways. 
 
Conclusion 
The years between 1895 and 1913 were the period in which there was the 
strongest growth in Belgian foreign investment in tramways and Belgian com- 
panies took advantage of their expertise in light railways and trams. This 
growth was stimulated by a powerful fi  sector, with strong industrial 
links, which was looking for new markets for its heavy industries, a process 
which gave rise to the creation of a successful body of holding companies 
specialising in the management of this kind of company. In the 1890s the main 
recipients of Belgian capital for tram enterprises were Russia, Italy and Spain in 
Europe, and also Egypt and Argentina. In the inter-war years tramway invest- 
ment fell, and this gave rise to the redirection of investment towards the elec- 
tricity sector, which subsequently provoked important mergers. Belgian foreign 
investment in tramways decreased considerably, and there were both short and 
long-term reasons for the decline. To a great extent the majority of tramway 
networks had been completed, so the demand for equipment – one of the main 
attractions of the industry from the holding companies’ point of view – 
declined.59 Trams faced new forms of competition in buses and underground 
railways, and they began to lose their technological supremacy in the urban 
transport sector. Furthermore the fi system combined with the insta- 
bility of exchange rates meant that the cost infl   of the 1914–21 period led 
to lower profi and investments abroad were consequently less attractive to 
Belgian investors. Tramway undertakings were hardly ever particularly prof- 
itable ventures in themselves;60 the real benefi to the electromechanical groups 
that controlled the tram companies lay in the fact that the electrifi and 
enlargement of the networks created a considerable market for their products. 
Finally, the rise of nationalist ideologies triggered a process by which many 
Belgian-owned tram companies passed into the hands of private domestic 
owners or, less frequently, into the hands of town and city councils. 
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